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THE CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE
RULE, CONCERT OF ACTION,
ALTERNATIVE LIABILITY, AND
RELATED DOCTRINES IN SOUTH
CAROLINA: RELAXING AND SHIFTING




Even the clearest and most perfect circumstantial evidence
is likely to be at fault, after all, and therefore ought to be re-
ceived with great caution. Take the case of any pencil, sharp-
ened by any woman: if you have witnesses, you will find she
did it with a knife; but if you take simply the aspect of the
pencil, you will say she did it with her teeth.1
I. INTRODUCTION
To state a cause of action in tort under South Carolina law,
a plaintiff must prove that a defendant owed him a duty, that
the defendant breached that duty, and that the breach of that
duty caused the plaintiff to suffer injuries which are capable of
measurement and not merely speculative or conjectural.2 With
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1. M. TWAIN, PUDD'NHEAD WILSON 123 (1981)(from Pudd'nhead Wilson's Calendar).
In 1894 Twain wrote PUDD'NHEAD WILSON, an intriguing tale of a misunderstood lawyer
who eventually vindicates himself.
2. Ryan v. Eli Lilly & Co., 514 F. Supp. 1004 (D.S.C. 1981); Kemmerlin v. Wingate,
1
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respect to causation, a plaintiff must establish that the defen-
dant's breach was both the "cause in fact"3 and the "proximate
cause"14 of the plaintiff's injury.5 Under normal circumstances,
the plaintiff must prove each of these elements by a preponder-
ance of the evidence.6 In certain instances, however, South Caro-
lina courts have either relaxed the plaintiff's burden with re-
spect to these elements or placed upon the defendant a burden
normally allocated to the plaintiff. This Article discusses the use
of evidentiary presumptions in South Carolina and reviews sev-
eral South Carolina Federal District Court decisions which have
addressed enterprise liability and market share liability.7
When a defendant is responsible for a plaintiff's inability to
274 S.C. 62, 261 S.E.2d 50 (1979); Howard v. Riddle, 266 S.C. 149, 221 S.E.2d 865 (1976);
Sherrill v. So. Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 260 S.C. 494, 197 S.E.2d 283 (1973); Mickle v. Black-
mon, 252 S.C. 202, 166 S.E.2d 173 (1969), appeal after rem., 255 S.C. 136, 177 S.E.2d 548
(1970); Wimberly v. Winn-Dixie Greenville, Inc., 252 S.C. 117, 165 S.E.2d 627 (1969);
Delk v. Liggett & Myers Tobacco Co., 180 S.C. 436, 186 S.E. 383 (1936).
3. See Torts, Annual Survey of South Carolina Law, 27 S.CL. REv. 554, 555 (1970).
See generally W. PROSSER & W.P. KEEON, THE LAW OF TORTS § 41 at 263-72 (5th ed.
1984). The finder of fact must determine that the plaintiffs injuries would not have
occurred "but for" the defendant's conduct. Id. at 265-66.
4. See generally W. PROSSER & W.P. KEETON, supra note 3, § 42 at 272-80; Lewis,
Proximate Cause in Law, 7 FLA. ST. BAL.J. 109 (1933); Torts, Annual Survey of South
Carolina Law, 27 S.C.L. REV. 554, 555 (1970). Proximate causation is a determination
that, as a matter of policy, the defendant should be held legally responsible for the con-
duct involved. Professors Prosser and Keeton assert that the use of the phrase "can lead
only to utter confusion." W. PROSSER & W.P. KEETON, supra note 3, § 42 at 273.
5. South Carolina courts often consider both elements of causation under the single
term "proximate cause." See, e.g., Hughes v. Children's Clinic, P.A., 269 S.C. 389, 237
S.E.2d 753 (1977); Horton v. Greyhound Corp., 241 S.C. 430, 128 S.E.2d 776 (1962); Ker-
shaw Motor Co. v. Southern Ry., 136 S.C. 377, 134 S.E. 377 (1926); Willis v. Floyd Brace
Co., 279 S.C. 458, 309 S.E.2d 295 (Ct. App. 1983). In Floyd Brace Co., the court of ap-
peals stated that in South Carolina, "[p]roximate cause is the efficient or direct cause of
an injury. Negligence is deemed to be the proximate cause of an injury when, without
such negligence, the injury would not have occurred or could have been avoided." 279
S.C. at 461-62, 309 S.E.2d at 297-98.
6. See, e.g., King v. J.C. Penney Co., 238 S.C. 336, 340, 120 S.E.2d 229, 230 (1961)(a
preponderance of the evidence is "the greater weight" of the evidence). "'Preponderance
of the evidence,' when described in terms of percentages, is set at fifty percent to indi-
cate that a quantum over fifty percent constitutes a preponderance. The verbal defini-
tion of 'preponderance' is 'more probable than not.'" McCauliff, Burden of Proof: De-
grees of Belief, Quanta of Evidence, or Constitutional Guarantees?, 35 VAND. L. REv.
1293, 1303 (1982). See also C. McCoRMICK, MCCORMICK ON EVmENCE § 339 at 793-96 (2d
ed. 1972).
7. Commentators and judges have alternately labeled the doctrines discussed in this
Article as theories of liability, rules of evidence, measures of damage, among others. For
convenience, this Article uses the phrase "proof doctrines" to describe them collectively.
2
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present evidence or when a plaintiff cannot prove which defen-
dant caused an injury, South Carolina courts have used the cir-
cumstantial evidence rule" and the concert of action doctrine9 to
affect the procedural aspects of the plaintiff's case. The circum-
stantial evidence rule may affect a plaintiff's burden of estab-
lishing both breach of duty and causation and has been repeat-
edly likened to res ipsa loquitur, a doctrine which supposedly is
not recognized in South Carolina.10 In cases involving multiple
defendants who may have caused the injury, the application of
alternative liability, concert of action, enterprise liability, and
market share liability may affect a plaintiff's burden of estab-
lishing the nexus between a particular defendant and the plain-
tiff's injury. This Article addresses these doctrines with respect
to negligence and products liability actions.1
II. PROCEDURAL ASPECTS OF A PLAINTIFF'S BURDEN OF PROOF
A plaintiff in a tort action must first plead those elements
necessary to establish his cause of action and must produce suf-
ficient evidence on each element to "justify a reasonable jury in
finding the existence" of that element.12 After doing so, the
plaintiff bears the burden of proof with respect to all elements
of the cause of action. 3 Professor McCormick explained the dif-
8. See infra notes 77-126 and accompanying text.
9. See infra notes 128-42 and accompanying text.
10. See infra notes 75-76 and accompanying text.
11. Negligence occurs when a defendant breaches a duty of due care owed to the
plaintiff. The presence of gross negligence, willfulness, wantonness, or recklessness may
affect the plaintiff's case. A discussion of these considerations, however, is beyond the
scope of this Article. In a products liability action, the relevant duty is a duty not to sell
products in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous to the user or consumer. See
S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-73-10 (1976) (statutory adoption of RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTs
§ 402A (1965)). Products liability actions typically involve claims that the defendant has
breached certain other duties, such as the express or implied warranties contained in S.C.
CODE ANN. §§ 36-2-313 to -315 (1976). See Crystal, Consumer Product Warranty Litiga-
tion in South Carolina, 31 S.C.L. REV. 293 (1980); Montgomery & Owen, Reflections on
the Theory and Administration of Strict Tort Liability for Defective Products, 27 S.C.L.
REV. 803 (1976).
12. McNaughton, Burden of Production of Evidence: A Function of a Burden of
Persuasion, 68 HARv. L. REV. 1382, 1383 (1955). The burden of producing evidence is also
described as the "burden of going forward" and the "burden of explanation." Id. See
also Morgan, Instructing the Jury Upon Presumptions and Burdens of Proof, 47 HARv.
L. REV. 59 (1933).
13. C. MCCORMICK, supra note 6, § 337 at 785. The burden of proof is also known as
3
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ference between these burdens:
The burden of producing evidence on an issue means the
liability to an adverse ruling (generally a finding of directed
verdict) if evidence on the issue has not been produced. It is
usually cast first upon the party who has pleaded the existence
of the fact, but . . . the burden may shift to the adversary
when the pleader has discharged his initial duty.14 The burden
of producing evidence is a critical mechanism in a jury trial, as
it empowers the judge to decide the case without jury consider-
ation when a party fails to sustain the burden.
The burden of persuasion becomes a crucial factor only if
the parties have sustained their burdens of producing evidence
and only when all of the evidence has been introduced ...
When the time for a decision comes, the jury, if there is one,
must be instructed how to decide the issue if their minds are
left in doubt. The jury must be told that if the party having
the burden of persuasion has failed to satisfy that burden, the
issue is to be decided against him. If there is no jury and the
judge finds himself in doubt, he too must decide the issue
against the party having the burden of persuasion.15
Proving certain facts may create an inference or a presump-
tion in favor of the plaintiff."' In other words, the proof of one
fact may suggest or establish a second fact or a conclusion. The
factfinder usually must treat an inference simply as additional
evidence for consideration along with other evidence presented
at trial. On the other hand, proving certain facts may raise a
"presumption" '17 rather than an inference. A presumption differs
significantly from an inference. A presumption"8 has one of two
the "burden of persuasion" and the "risk of nonpersuasion." See McNaughton, supra
note 12, at 1283-84.
14. For a discussion of "shifting" this burden, see infra note 19 and accompanying
text.
15. C. MCCORIcK, supra note 6, § 336 at 784 (footnote omitted)(footnote 14
added).
16. For a discussion of the definition and effect of these concepts, see C. McCoR-
Micx, supra note 6, § 336 at 783-85. Courts are not consistent in the use of these terms.
South Carolina courts approve an "inference" which requires a defendant to come for-
ward with evidence. See infra note 115 and accompanying text.
17. A presumption is more conclusive than an inference; that is, a presumption goes
further to prove a fact then does an inference.
18. Presumptions are either rebuttable or "irrebuttable." If a plaintiff establishes a
rebuttable presumption, the defendant may still offer proof to disprove the presumption.
An "irrebuttable" presumption, however, is technically a conclusion, and not a presump-
4
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procedural effects: e;ther the defendant must produce evidence
contrary to the fact or conclusion presumed or the defendant
must prove the contrary of the fact or conclusion presumed.19 In
a situation in which a presumption has the former effect, the
plaintiff retains the burden of proof with respect to the fact or
conclusion presumed, but the defendant must at least offer some
evidence tending to negate the existence of the item presumed.
In a situation in which a presumption has the latter effect, how-
ever, both a burden of production and the burden of proof shift
to the defendant, and the defendant must offer evidence tending
to negate the existence of the item presumed as well as prove its
nonexistence.
In the case of an inference, when the defendant moves for
an involuntary nonsuit at the close of the plaintiff's case, the
judge, considering the inference along with the other evidence,
presumably rules on the motion according to the traditional
standard.20 Upon the judge's denial of the motion, the defendant
could technically rest without presenting evidence. The judge
could then rule on further motions and the finder of fact could
reach a verdict in the usual manner. The plaintiff retains the
burden of proving the fact or element upon which the inference
arises.
tion. In South Carolina, the violation of a safety statute is negligence per se; that is, the
violation conclusively establishes a defendant's breach of the duty to use due care. See,
e.g., Cantrell v. Carruth, 250 S.C. 415, 158 S.E.2d 208 (1967)(violation of statute requir-
ing motorist to yield to pedestrian); Morrow v. Evans, 233 S.C. 288, 75 S.E.2d 598
(1953)(violation of statutes prohibiting excessive automobile speed and traveling in
wrong lane); Coleman v. Shaw, 281 S.C. 107, 314 S.E.2d 154 (Ct. App. 1984)(violation of
regulations requiring presence of public pool owner's employee at pool).
19. Most commentators speak of this process as "shifting" the burden of production
to the defendant. See, e.g., C. MCCORMICK, supra note 6, § 342 at 803; McNaughton,
supra note 12, at 1384. A burden of production remains on a plaintiff, however. Once the
plaintiff has met his burden of production, and has thereby raised a presumption, the
defendant must also at least produce evidence. Therefore, a presumption creates, rather
than shifts, a burden of production. The burden "shifting" terminology is used herein
because of its common usage in other works.
20. In ruling upon a motion for involuntary nonsuit or directed verdict, the court
must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-movant to determine
whether more than one conclusion may be reasonably inferred from the evidence. If
more than one conclusion may reasonably be inferred or there is doubt concerning the
conclusion that may be inferred, the judge must deny the motion and submit the case to
the jury. If there is but one such conclusion to be inferred from the evidence, the judge
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In the case of a presumption, the judge treats the element
upon which the presumption operates as established when ruling
on a defendant's motion for involuntary nonsuit. If the pre-
sumption only shifts the burden of production, however, a plain-
tiff may survive the involuntary nonsuit motion, force the defen-
dant to present evidence, and yet not prove his cause of action
by a preponderance of the evidence. This situation results if the
judge determines that the plaintiff has established a prima facie
case, denies the involuntary nonsuit motion, and requires the
defendant to present evidence tending to negate the existence of
the element presumed, but the factfinder determines that the
plaintiff has not proven the issue by a preponderance of the evi-
dence.21 If the presumption shifts the burden of proof of an ele-
ment, the parties switch roles with respect to that element. If
the plaintiff survives the involuntary nonsuit motion, the defen-
dant must not only present evidence tending to negate the exis-
tence of the element presumed, but must also disprove the exis-
tence of that element by a preponderance of the evidence.22
The proof doctrines may also alter the normal course of trial
with respect to the standard of proof by which the plaintiff must
prove his case. Altering the standard of proof differs from plac-
ing upon the defendant a burden which is not normally allocated
to him. In terms of the practical effect, however, the defendant's
burdens are increased to the extent a plaintiff's burdens are less-
ened. Because of the complexities of trial procedure, requiring
proof by less than a preponderance of the evidence is similar to
creating a presumption in favor of the plaintiff. The plaintiff's
proof of a prima facie case in a relaxed-burden situation may
effectively require a defendant to come forward with rebuttal ev-
idence and, if the burden is relaxed far enough, to disprove the
fact or element in question. South Carolina courts appear to use
21. This is true because the plaintiff must establish only a prima facie case to resist
a motion for involuntary nonsuit. A plaintiff must offer "evidence of such quality and
weight that reasonable and fair-minded men in the exercise of impartial judgment might
reach different conclusions" to establish a prima facie case. C. McCoRMIcK, supra note 6,
§ 338 at 790 (quoting Boeing Co. v. Shipman, 411 F.2d 365, 374 (5th Cir. 1969)).
22. For example, if the burden of proving negligence shifts to the defendant, the
defendant must present evidence and prove that he was not negligent. Therefore, the
defendant must establish lack of negligence prima facie to resist the plaintiff's motions
for a directed verdict and by a preponderance of the evidence to prevent an adverse
finding on that point.
572 [Vol. 36
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the terms "relax the burden" and "shift the burden"
interchangeably.23
In summary, the proof doctrines may have one of several
procedural effects. A proof doctrine may generate an inference,
which is merely another factor for consideration by the
factfinder in the normal course of the trial. On the other hand, a
proof doctrine may raise a presumption which, in turn, creates a
burden of production, shifts the burden of proof, or conclusively
establishes a fact or element of a cause of action.
III. PROOF DOcTRINES IN SOUTH CAROLINA
South Carolina courts have addressed indirect proof with
respect to two elements of a plaintiff's case: proof of breach of a
duty owed and proof of causation. Concerning proof of negli-
gence, plaintiffs have repeatedly requested the South Carolina
Supreme Court to adopt res ipsa loquitur,24 a common law doc-
trine prevailing in nearly all jurisdictions.25 South Carolina
courts have consistently rejected the doctrine by name,26 but fol-
low a doctrine known as the circumstantial evidence rule,27
which is similar in certain respects. 28 South Carolina courts con-
23. Courts appear to prefer to "relax the plaintiff's burdens" rather than to "shift a
burden to the defendant" because the latter concept is arguably a more radical departure
from the standard trial format. See, e.g., Brock v. Carolina Scenic Stages, 219 S.C. 360,
366, 65 S.E.2d 468, 470 (1951)(court took "a very liberal view of the testimony," and
effectively shifted the burden of production to the defendant).
24. Chief Baron Pollock of England, in Byrne v. Boadle, 159 Eng. Rep. 299 (1863),
borrowed the phrase "the thing speaks for itself" from Latin to describe a situation
which was obvious, yet not subject to direct proof. See generally Griffith & Griffith, The
Doctrine of Res Ipsa Loquitur in Negligence Actions-Old Solutions for New Problems,
48 Miss. L.J. 259 (1977)(an analysis of common law refinements in the application of the
doctrine of res ipsa loquitur).
25. W. PROSSER & W-P. KEETON, supra note 3, § 39 at 244.
26. See infra note 76 for a listing of cases rejecting the doctrine.
27. See infra notes 77-126 and accompanying text.
28. Some authors claim that South Carolina follows res ipsa loquitur under the
guise of the circumstantial evidence rule or by some other subterfuge. See, e.g., W. PROS-
SER & WY. KEETON, supra note 3, § 39 at 244; Prosser, The Procedural Effect of Res
Ipsa Loquitur, 20 MINN. L. REv. 241, 253-54 (1936); Comment, Medical Malprac-
tice-The "Locality Rule" and the "Conspiracy of Silence," 22 S.C.L. REV. 810, 820
(1970); Torts, Annual Survey of South Carolina Law, 21 S.C.L. REv. 659, 663-65 (1969).
Several South Carolina Supreme Court justices have expressed a similar view and have
called on the state supreme court to adopt the doctrine expressly. See, e.g., Barnwell v.
Elliott, 225 S.C. 62, 68, 80 S.E.2d 748, 751 (1954)(Baker, C.J., dissenting); Orr v. Saylor,
253 S.C. 155, 163, 169 S.E.2d 396, 400 (1969)(Weatherford, A.A.J., dissenting). For a
19851
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sistently permit a plaintiff to resort to the circumstantial evi-
dence rule to prove both negligence and causation.
In cases in which a plaintiff brings suit against two or more
defendants and, without fault on his part, cannot identify which
defendant or defendants actually caused an injury, some courts
have permitted recovery under the theory of alternative liabil-
ity.2 9 The South Carolina Federal District Court has twice hy-
pothesized that South Carolina would reject market share liabil-
ity,30 a theory similar in certain respects to alternative liability3'
and enterprise liability.32 Under the theory of concert of action,
however, South Carolina courts permit recovery against a defen-
dant involved with others in a tortious activity which inflicts in-
jury on a plaintiff, despite the fact that the particular defendant
found liable did not actually inflict the injury.
33
A. The Circumstantial Evidence Rule and Res Ipsa Loquitur
Res ipsa loquitur is an evidentiary doctrine that permits a
factfinder to infer or presume a defendant's negligence from
proof of certain facts.3 4 The expression first became part of An-
glo-Saxon law in 1863 in Byrne v. Boadle,35 an English case in
which a flour barrel injured the plaintiff when it fell from a win-
dow of the defendant's warehouse. In Byrne the plaintiff could
not offer direct proof which would have established the defen-
dant's negligence with respect to the barrel's falling from the
window. The court nevertheless permitted recovery. Remarking
on the lack of direct evidence of the defendant's negligence, the
court reasoned that of certain events "it may be said res ipsa
discussion of the difference between these doctrines, see infra note 101 and accompany-
ing text.
29. Summers v. Tice, 33 Cal. 2d 80, 199 P.2d 1 (1948). Summers v. Tice contains the
classic statement of this theory of liability, which is now embodied in RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 433B(3)(1979). For a discussion of this doctrine, see infra notes
149-52 and accompanying text.
30. Mizell v. Eli Lilly & Co., 526 F. Supp. 589 (D.S.C. 1981); Ryan v. Eli Lilly & Co.,
514 F. Supp. 1004 (D.S.C. 1981). For an analysis of the district court's determination, see
infra notes 160-64 and accompanying text.
31. See infra notes 153-59 and accompanying text.
32. See infra notes 143-48 and accompanying text.
33. Skipper v. Hartley, 242 S.C. 221, 130 S.E.2d 486 (1963). See infra notes 128-42
and accompanying text for a discussion of the concert of action theory.
34. Griffith & Griffith, supra note 24, at 261.
35. 159 Eng. Rep. 299 (1863).
[Vol. 36
8
South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 36, Iss. 4 [2020], Art. 3
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol36/iss4/3
1985] PLAINTIFF'S BURDENS
loquitur [the thing speaks for itself]."3 At its introduction, ihe
doctrine was "a common-sense appraisal of the probative value
of circumstantial evidence"37 and a "formulation of a species of
circumstantial evidence"38 which was somewhat amorphous and
without strict prerequisite for its application.
Since its introduction, the doctrine has developed somewhat
rigid requirements for its use by a plaintiff. 9 The usual reason
given for permitting use of the doctrine is a plaintiff's inability
to present direct evidence of negligence. 40 Accordingly, a plain-
tiff usually may employ the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur only by
proving that:
(1) [T]he accident [is] one which ordinarily would not occur in
the absence of someone's negligence; (2) the instrumentality
which caused the accident [is one] within the defendant's ex-
clusive control; (3) the injured party's conduct [did not con-
tribute] to the accident; and (4) the injured party [is not] in a
position to show the particular circumstances which caused the
instrumentality to injure him.
41
In instances in which the doctrine applies, courts typically in-
struct the jury that it may find that the injury would not have
occurred without the defendant's negligence.
Jurisdictions differ with respect to the procedural effect of
the doctrine. 2 At the very least, the application of the doctrine
36. Id. at 301. In Byrne, the court wrote that "in some cases the courts have held
that the mere fact of the accident having occurred is evidence of negligence." Id.
37. Note, Res Ipsa Loquitur: The Extent to Which Plaintiff May Establish Negli-
gence, 42 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 410, 410 (1968)(citing Galbraith v. Busch, 267 N.Y. 230, 234,
196 N.E. 36, 38 (1935)).
38. Note, supra note 37, at 410 (citing Zaninovich v. American Airlines, Inc., 26
A.D.2d 155, 157, 271 N.Y.S.2d 886, 869 (1966)).
39. See W. PROSSER & W.P. KEETON, supra note 3, § 39 at 244; infra note 41 and
accompanying text.
40. Note, supra note 37, at 411; Griffith & Griffith, supra note 24, at 263. It is also
often said that res ipsa loquitur applies when "affirmative evidence of a defendant's
negligence is more than likely within the defendant's exclusive knowledge and control."
Griffith & Griffith, supra note 24, at 263.
41. Griffith & Griffith, supra note 24, at 261 (citing Morgan v. Miss. Power Co., 298
So. 2d 698, 700 (Miss. 1974)). Some jurisdictions which accept the doctrine do not specif-
ically require the fourth element. W. PROSSER & W-P. KEETON, supra note 3, § 39 at 244-
45. For a more detailed discussion of each of the elements, see generally 2 S. SPEISER,
THE NEGLIGENCE CAsEL RES IPSA LoQurrUR (1972). See also Note, Res Ipsa Loqui-
tur-Doctrine of Exclusive Control of the Instrumentality, 41 N.C.L. REV. 301 (1963).
42. Prosser, supra note 28, at 241-43. See generally supra notes 12-24 and accompa-
9
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creates an inference, which allows the factfinder to find negli-
gence. This version of res ipsa loquitur does not require the de-
fendant to produce evidence and does not shift the burden of
proof to the defendant.43 On the other hand, the doctrine may
create a presumption, which has one of two procedural effects.
The presumption version of res ipsa loquitur compels the defen-
dant to come forward with evidence that tends to disprove his
negligence, but may also require the defendant to prove that he
was not negligent."
1. Early South Carolina Decisions
Several early South Carolina cases appear to have followed
res ipsa loquitur in its strongest form, which shifts the burden
of proof to the defendant. In Sullivan v. Charleston & Western
Carolina Railway Co.,45 a railroad passenger suffered paralysis
of his legs upon falling backwards when his seat gave way.46 The
plaintiff in Sullivan demonstrated that several screws missing
from the seat's frame caused his fall, but could not identify who
had removed the screws,47 and thus could not prove directly
whether the defendant had been negligent. The South Carolina
Supreme Court discussed and upheld the trial judge's charge:
The presiding judge charged the jury that the burden was
on plaintiff to prove that he was injured while a passenger, by
some agency or instrumentality of defendant; and, if the plain-
tiff had proved those facts, the law raised a presumption that
the defendant was guilty of negligence and the burden was
then shifted to defendant to prove that the injury did not re-
sult from its negligence. The defendant contends that this in-
struction was erroneous, and that the burden of proof was
upon the plaintiff throughout the case, and that when a prima
facie case was made out by proof of injury to plaintiff while a
passenger, the only burden then on the defendant was to intro-
duce evidence tending to show that the injury was not caused
nying text.
43. See Prosser, supra note 28, at 244. See also supra notes 12-24 and accompany-
ing text.
44. See Prosser, supra note 28, at 244. In other words, this version creates a burden
of production and also shifts the burden of proof to the defendant.
45. 85 S.C. 532, 67 S.E. 905 (1910).




South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 36, Iss. 4 [2020], Art. 3
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol36/iss4/3
PLAINTIFF'S BURDENS
by its negligence; but that, when all the evidence was in, unless
the greater weight of it showed negligence on the part of the
defendant, the plaintiff could not recover. Upon this proposi-
tion the authorities elsewhere are in conflict, but the rule in




Apparently, even the defendant accepted the application of res
ipsa loquitur, but asserted that the doctrine merely required
him to produce evidence and did not shift the burden of proof.
The court in Sullivan relied upon the earlier case of Joyner
v. South Carolina Railway Co.,49 an action against a railroad for
the death of two mules. Joyner purportedly settled the " 'misap-
prehension as to the real point' -50 of Danner v. South Carolina
Railway Co.51 concerning South Carolina's acceptance of a doc-
trine permitting proof by an indirect method and the doctrine's
procedural effect. In Danner, the plaintiff's cattle were killed by
the defendant's train traveling along tracks located on the plain-
tiff's property. 52 There was, however, "no [direct] evidence
whatever of the circumstances or manner in which they were de-
stroyed. '5 3 Therefore, the plaintiff could not prove directly that
the defendant negligently destroyed the cattle, even though the
defendant admitted that the train killed the cattle. The defen-
dant claimed that it could not be held responsible for the de-
struction of the cattle unless the plaintiff proved that it had
been negligent in doing so. The trial judge, sitting without a
jury, held the defendant liable when the defendant failed to
prove that it was not negligent and had not caused the plaintiff's
48. Id. at 535, 67 S.E. at 906 (citing Joyner v. S.C. Ry. Co., 26 S.C. 49, 1 S.E. 52
(1887); Steele v. S. Ry., 55 S.C. 389, 33 S.E. 509 (1899); Doolittle v. S. Ry., 62 S.C. 130, 40
S.E. 133 (1901)).
49. 26 S.C. 49, 1 S.E. 52 (1887).
50. Id. at 63, 1 S.E. at 62 (McIver, J., dissenting)(quoting Jones v. Columbia &
Greenville R.R., 20 S.C. 249, 254 (1883)). Justice McIver wrote a lengthy and vigorous
dissent to Joyner. Justice McIver felt that the decision in Danner "did not in any way
infringe upon the well-settled and time-honored rule that he who alleges must prove, and
that a plaintiff must therefore establish by legal and satisfactory evidence all the essen-
tial elements of his cause of action." Id. at 61-62, 1 S.E. at 62. Justice McIver felt that
the decision permitted only the creation of an inference. Id. at 62, 1 S.E. at 63.
51. 16 S.C.L. (4 Rich.) 329 (1851).
52. Id. at 330-31.
53. Id. at 331.
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loss. 4 The court reasoned that because the defendant's employ-
ees were in control of the train, and because there were no other
witnesses of the damage to plaintiff's cattle, the defendant was
required to prove that it was not negligent.5 5 The court also
noted the defendant railroad's policy of holding their engineers
responsible for the value of livestock killed during that engi-
neer's operation of a train.56 The trial judge reasoned that such a
policy "could not have been adopted or tolerated if it were not
true that at least most frequently such destruction [of livestock]
is caused by culpable want of care.
''
5
The court of appeals upheld the trial court, but did not
clearly articulate whether it approved the procedural effect the
trial judge gave to the doctrine, which shifted the burden of
proof."8 The majority in Joyner interpreted Danner as approv-
ing the shifting of the burden of proof when the doctrine ap-
plied, and the court in Sullivan reaffirmed that interpretation. 9
At least by the time of the decision in Joyner, therefore, South
Carolina apparently followed res ipsa loquitur without expressly
identifying the doctrine.60 The court's discussion of the facts in
Danner and Joyner reveals that the plaintiffs in those cases es-
tablished the traditional elements prerequisite to the doctrine's
application. Each plaintiff demonstrated that his loss ordinarily
would not have occurred without the defendant's negligence,
that the defendant controlled the instrumentality which caused
the loss, and that he could not present direct evidence concern-
ing the circumstances surrounding the loss. 1 The operation of
the doctrine shifted the burden of proof to the defendant to
54. Id. at 332-33.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 332.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 337-38.
59. 85 S.C. at 535, 67 S.E. at 906. The court in Joyner stated that the court in
Danner held that the fact of the loss itself presumed negligence because "proof of the
single fact of the killing ... shall have the effect in the first instance of the proof of all
the facts necessary to show negligence." 26 S.C. at 53, 1 S.E. at 54.
60. The principles in Danner and similar cases are not limited in application to the
killing of livestock by railroad companies. See, e.g., Jennings v. Fundeburg, 15 S.C.L. (4
McCord) 161 (1827)(negligent shooting of slaves).
61. The defendant in Joyner introduced evidence that the plaintiff did not fence his
livestock, but the court in Joyner and other similar cases did not discuss the plaintiff's
fault, although some courts require an absence of fault for the operation of res ipsa
loquitur. See supra note 41 and accompanying text.
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prove lack of negligence6 2 and, more importantly, did not ex-
pressly require the plaintiff to prove each element.
2. Current South Carolina Law
In 1931, the South Carolina Supreme Court expressly re-
fused to apply res ipsa loquitur in a case involving a workplace
injury3 which predated the adoption of Workers' Compensation
in South Carolina. 4 In Weston v. Hillyer,5 the plaintiff argued
that decisions in similar workplace cases" were applications of
res ipsa loquitur6 7 The supreme court agreed with the plaintiff's
"suggestion for the application of that doctrine"6 8 but found
that the doctrine did not apply to the case at bar, in which the
injury was "just as likely" the fault of someone other than the
defendant. 9 The court in Weston concluded, however, that the
decisions upon which the plaintiff relied were not the products
of res ipsa loquitur,7 0 that it ould find no South Carolina au-
thority for the application of the doctrine, and that it could find
62. The court in Joyner discussed the doctrine's procedural effect-
[T]he presumption in these cases being a legal one, drawn by the law, can be
removed in no other way than by evidence sufficiently strong to rebut it. When
the defendant offers no evidence, it becomes conclusive; when the defendant
offers evidence which not only fails to explain, but in itself shows negligence, of
course the plaintiff will prevail. But if the defendant's evidence overthrows the
prima facies and makes out afL .natively a case of accident, the presumption is
gone and the plaintiff must fail. . . . [If] the evidence of defendant proves
nothing, neither negligence nor the want of it, . . . [the presumption] remains
until the explanation offered is strong enough to rebut it by making out affirm-
atively a case of accident.
26 S.C. at 55-56, 1 S.E. at 56.
63. Weston v. Hillyer, 160 S.C. 541, 159 S.E. 390 (1931).
64. Now codified at S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 42-1-10 to 42-19-40 (1976 & Supp. 1984).
65. 160 S.C. 541, 159 S.E. 390 (1931).
66. See, e.g., Grainger v. Greenville, S. & A. Ry., 101 S.C. 73, 85 S.E. 231 (1915)
(plaintiff's decedent died when he was crushed in a cave-in). In Grainger, the plaintiff
recovered for the employer's negligence in failing to provide a safe workplace, but could
not offer direct proof that the defendant had been negligent with respect to the particu-
lar circumstances surrounding the death. Id. at 81-84, 85 S.E. at 231-32.
67. 160 S.C. at 545, 159 S.E. at 391.
68. Id. The plaintiff contended that the doctrine should apply "in the case of an
unexplained accident which according to the common experience of mankind, would not
have happened without fault on the part of the defendant." Id. (quoting Ash v. Childs
Dining Hall, 231 Mass. 86, 90, 120 N.E. 396, 397 (1918)).
69. 160 S.C. at 545, 159 S.E. at 391 (quoting Ash v. Childs Dining Hall, 231 Mass.
86, 90, 120 N.E. 396, 397 (1918)).
70. Id. at 545-46, 159 S.E. at 391.
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abundant authority to the contrary.71 The court in Weston
failed to distinguish Sullivan and the livestock destruction
cases,7 2 which apparently approved the doctrine.73 Moreover, the
court contradicted itself by validating the use of the theory later
in its opinion:
It is the duty of the plaintiff to prove negligence affirmatively,
and while the inferences allowed by the rule or doctrine of res
ipsa loquitur constitute such proof, it is only where the cir-
cumstances leave no room for a different presumption that the
maxim applies. When it is shown that the accident might have
happened as the result of one of two causes, the reason for the
rule fails and it cannot be invoked.
7 4
Arguably, the decision in Weston approved res ipsa loquitur in
certain circumstances, but denied its application to the facts of
that case.
Later the same year, without citing authority, the supreme
court flatly rejected the doctrine in Bridge v. Orange Crush Bot-
tlers. 5 The court has since reaffirmed the rejection of res ipsa
loquitur in numerous decisions.76
71. Id. at 546, 159 S.E. at 391.
72. See supra notes 45-62 and accompanying text. This failure is perhaps attributa-
ble to the fact that neither party brought these cases to the court's attention.
73. Id.
74. 160 S.C. at 549, 159 S.E. at 392 (quoting Klein v. Beeten, 169 Wis. 385, 389, 172
N.W. 736, 738 (1919)).
75. 164 S.C. 351, 358, 162 S.E. 325, 328 (1932)(employee's loss of an eye from ex-
ploding soft drink bottle). Justice Bonham, who authored the earlier opinion in Weston,
wrote the court's unanimous opinion in Bridge.
76. Legette v. Smith, 265 S.C. 573, 220 S.E.2d 429 (1975); Crider v. Infinger Transp.
Co,, 248 S.C. 10, 148 S.E.2d 732 (1966); Bellamy v. Hardee, 242 S.C. 71, 129 S.E.2d 905
(1963); Boyd v. Marion Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 240 S.C. 383, 126 S.E.2d 178 (1962);
Bruno v. Pendleton Realty Co., 240 S.C. 46, 124 S.E.2d 580 (1962); King v. J.C. Penney
Co., 238 S.C. 336, 120 S.E.2d 229 (1961); Shepherd v. U.S. Fidelity and Guar. Co., 233
S.C. 536, 106 S.E.2d 381 (1958); Hunter v. Dixie Home Stores, 232 S.C. 139, 101 S.E.2d
262 (1958); Daniels v. Timmons, 216 S.C. 539, 59 S.E.2d 149, cert. denied, 340 U.S. 841
(1950); Merchant v. Columbia Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 214 S.C. 206, 51 S.E.2d 749
(1949); Carroll v. S.C. Nat'l Bank, 211 S.C. 406, 45 S.E.2d 729 (1948); Watson v. Cox
Bros. Lumber Co., 203 S.C. 125, 26 S.E.2d 401 (1943); Albergotti v. Dixie Produce Co.,
202 S.C. 357, 25 S.E.2d 156 (1943); Eickhoff v. Beard-Laney, Inc., 199 S.C. 500, 20 S.E.2d
153 (1942); Shields v. Chevrolet Truck, 195 S.C. 437, 12 S.E.2d 19 (1941); Gilland v.
Peter's Dry Cleaning Co., 195 S.C. 417, 11 S.E.2d 857 (1940); Poliakoff v. Shelton, 193
S.C. 398, 8 S.E.2d 494 (1940); Gantt v. Columbia Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 193 S.C. 51, 7
S.E.2d 641 (1940); Irick v. Peoples Baking Co., 187 S.C. 238, 196 S.E. 887 (1938); Hun-
sucker v. State Highway Department, 182 S.C. 441, 189 S.E. 652 (1937); Delk v. Liggett
and Myers Tobacco Co., 180 S.C. 436, 186 S.E. 383 (1936); Perry v. Carolina Theater, 180
14
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South Carolina courts have consistently preferred resolving
disputes by means of jury determination, 7 and, despite rejecting
res ipsa loquitur, have consistently approved of a similar doc-
trine, the circumstantial evidence rule. 8 In Peak v. Fripp,9 the
plaintiff brought a wrongful death action against the driver of an
automobile. The plaintiff's decedent died as a result of injuries
received as a passenger in an accident which occurred while the
defendant's son was driving the defendant's automobile.80 Only
the defendant's son and a man who had observed the speed of
the automobile prior to the accident could testify about the
event."' The court, however, found a sufficient basis for an infer-
ence that the guest passenger statute then in force82 had been
violated. 83 The court, discussing the lack of direct evidence that
the defendant's son had violated the statute, gave a general
description of the rule:
It is incumbent upon the plaintiff, in the absence of direct evi-
dence, to show the existence of such circumstances as would
justify the inference that the injury ... was due to the wrong-
ful act of the defendant, and not leave the question to mere
speculation or conjecture. The facts and circumstances shown
should be reckoned with in the light of ordinary experience
and such conclusions deduced therefrom as common sense
S.C. 130, 185 S.E. 184 (1936); Langston v. Fiske-Carter Constr. Co., 180 S.C. 113, 185
S.E. 62 (1936); Heath v. Town of Darlington, 175 S.C. 27, 177 S.E. 894 (1934); Montgom-
ery v. Conway Lumber Co., 171 S.C. 483, 172 S.E. 620 (1934); Correll v. City of Spartan-
burg, 169 S.C. 403, 169 S.E. 84 (1933); Weston v. Hillyer, 160 S.C. 541, 159 S.E. 390
(1931); Bain v. Self Memorial Hosp., 281 S.C. 138, 314 S.E.2d 603 (Ct. App. 1984); Cole-
man v. Shaw, 281 S.C. 107, 314 S.E.2d 154 (Ct. App. 1984).
77. See, e.g., S.C. CONST. art. I, § 14; McGlohon v. Harlin, 254 S.C. 207, 174 S.E.2d
753 (1970); Sumter Trust Co. v. Holman, 134 S.C. 412, 132 S.E. 811 (1926); Best v. Barn-
well County, 114 S.C. 123, 103 S.E. 479 (1920); Frazee v. Beattie, 26 S.C. 348, 2 S.E. 125
(1886); Smith v. Brice, 17 S.C. 538 (1881).
78. See Weston v. Hillyer, 160 S.C. 541, 545, 159 S.E. 390, 391 (1931). In Weston,
the court quoted the following language: "The burden of proof resting upon the plaintiff
to establish [negligence] must be sustained by evidence either direct or inferential." 160
S.C. at 545, 159 S.E. at 391 (italics omitted)(quoting Ash v. Childs Dining Hall, 231
Mass. 86, 90, 120 N.E. 396, 397 (1918)).
79. 195 S.C. 324, 11 S.E.2d 383 (1940).
80. Id. at 325, 11 S.E.2d at 384.
81. Id. at 328, 11 S.E.2d at 386.
82. This guest passenger statute was codified at § 5908 of the 1932 Code of South
Carolina Laws. It required proof of intentional, reckless, or heedless conduct.
83. 195 S.C. at 329, 11 S.E.2d at 385.
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dictates.84
Leek v. New South Express Lines85 also involved the appli-
cation of the circumstantial evidence rule to a fatal automobile
accident. In Leek, the plaintiff's decedent, driving alone, died
soon after he collided with the defendant's truck, leaving the de-
fendant as the only surviving eyewitness.8 6 Another driver and
his passenger saw the deceased's automobile just before the acci-
dent, but did not see the accident itself because of a crest in the
highway. s7 As a result, the plaintiff was forced to prove his case
by such circumstantial evidence as the position of the vehicles at
the accident scene, the type and location of the damage to the
vehicles, and the lack of skid marks a.8 The plaintiff recovered on
a verdict at trial, but the supreme court reversed. 9 The court
reasoned that the plaintiff was required to carry the burden of
proof with respect to the cause of the accident, but that he could
discharge that burden by showing "proof of circumstances which
would furnish a reasonable basis for the inference by the jury of
the ultimate fact that the death was caused by the wrongful act
of the defendant."90 Therefore, the court in Leek would have ap-
plied the circumstantial evidence rule if the plaintiff had estab-
lished a sufficient nexus between the proof offered and the con-
clusion that the defendant's act caused the plaintiff's death.
Tate v. Mauldin"' and Gantt v. Columbia Coca-Cola Bot-
tling Co. 2 involved the application of the circumstantial evi-
dence rule to facts concerning the ingestion of an adulterated
soft drink. In Tate, a mailman purchased a soft drink from a
retail store and, after consuming a portion of it, learned that the
drink contained the rotted remnants of a rat.9 3 At trial, a jury
returned a verdict for the plaintiff.94 The plaintiff in Tate could
84. Id. at 329, 11 S.E.2d at 385 (quoting Leek v. New South Express Lines, 192 S.C.
527, 534, 7 S.E.2d 459, 462 (1940)).
85. 192 S.C. 527, 7 S.E.2d 459 (1940).
86. Id. at 529, 7 S.E.2d at 460.
87. Id. at 530, 7 S.E.2d at 460.
88. Id. at 530-33, 7 S.E.2d at 461.
89. Id at 534-35, 7 S.E.2d at 462.
90. Id. See also Messier v. Adicks, 251 S.C. 268, 161 S.E.2d 845 (1968)(a case with a
similar holding).
91. 157 S.C. 392, 154 S.E. 431 (1929).
92. 193 S.C. 51, 7 S.E.2d 641 (1940).
93. 157 S.C. at 394-95, 154 S.E. at 432.
94. Id. at 396, 154 S.E. at 432.
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present no evidence of negligence on the part of the defendant
other than the presence of the rodent's remains.9 5 The plaintiff
could not prove by direct evidence when the rat entered the bot-
tle or who permitted or caused the rat's entry.9 In Gantt, the
contaminant in the soft drink was bluestone, a poisonous copper
sulphate used by farmers to protect corn, wheat, and oats from
rust.97 The plaintiff in Gantt similarly could not prove by direct
evidence who contaminated the soft drink or that the contami-
nation occurred while the soft drink was in the defendant's cus-
tody.9 8 In both cases, the South Carolina Supreme Court vali-
dated using the presence of the contaminant itself as
circumstantial evidence of the defendant's negligence.99
The circumstantial evidence rule embodied in Peak and
other early cases appears to be very similar in application and
effect to the early version of res ipsa loquitur. The early applica-
tion of the circumstantial evidence rule permitted the finder of
fact to consider the logical inferences reasonably drawn from
any indirect evidence presented. The judge, when ruling upon a
defendant's motion for involuntary nonsuit,100 could determine
whether the plaintiff had presented sufficient evidence to permit
the factfinder to find it more likely than not that the defendant
was negligent and had proximately caused the plaintiff's injury.
As with the early version of res ipsa loquitur, the circumstantial
evidence rule had no strict prerequisite items of proof, and per-
mitted all reasonable inferences to be drawn from the evidence
introduced at trial, but raised no presumption. 10'
95. Id. at 400-02, 154 S.E. at 434.
96. Id.
97. 193 S.C. at 53, 7 S.E.2d at 642.
98. Id. at 56, 7 S.E.2d at 643.
99. Tate, 157 S.C. at 402, 154 S.E. at 434; Gantt, 193 S.C. at 56, 7 S.E.2d at 643.
The court in Tate stated: "All the facts, and the inferences from these facts, were prop-
erly left by the presiding Judge to the jury. . . . Under the decisions of this Court, negli-
gence may be established by not only positive evidence, but by circumstantial evidence
as well." 157 S.C. at 401-02, 154 S.E. at 434 (citations omitted). The decisions in these
cases appear to allow the circumstantial evidence rule to operate in a fashion similar to
alternative liability. See infra notes 149-52 and accompanying text.
100. See supra notes 20-21 and accompanying text.
101. The rule differed from the later version of res ipsa loquitur in that,
Res ipsa loquitur and circumstantial evidence have been distinguished
upon the question whether the circumstances proved point merely to the phys-
ical cause of the occurrence, without having any tendency to indicate the re-
sponsible human agency, or, upon the other hand, have some tendency to indi-
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In Brock v. Carolina Scenic Stages,10 2 the supreme court
substantially altered the procedural effect of the circumstantial
evidence rule's application in certain instances. In Brock, the
plaintiff could not present direct evidence concerning a fatal col-
lision, which put her in a position similar to the plaintiffs' posi-
tions in Leek and Peak.03 In Brock, a pick-up truck collided
with a passenger bus in the early morning hours. 04 Prior to the
accident, the truck and the bus had been traveling in opposite
directions on a rain-slickened, two-lane road.1 05 The collision
killed the only occupants of the truck, a father and his twelve-
year-old daughter. 0 The physical evidence available to the
plaintiff consisted of the condition of the bus, the damage to the
left front portions of both vehicles, the gradation and curve of
the road at the site of the collision, and the position of the de-
bris from the vehicles on the roadway. 10 7 Two witnesses testified
for the plaintiff. One witness had observed the wreck scene after
the initial collision occurred but prior to the time the vehicles
came to rest. The second witness had seen the pick-up from a
considerable distance just before the collision occurred. The lat-
ter witness, a nineteen-year-old youth, testified that the truck
had been in the right lane traveling at approximately twenty-five
miles per hour prior to the accident.10 The defendant's bus
driver employee was the only eyewitness to the collision, but did
not testify. 09 The defendant offered photographs as its only evi-
cate some fault of omission or commission upon the part of the defendant. If
the former, it is necessary to invoke the rule of res ipsa loquitur, which is
applicable to the fact of negligence only, in order to make out a prima facie
case of negligence; if the latter, the general principle, which is applicable to all
matters of fact, that a fact may be established prima facie by circumstantial
evidence, suffices, without invoking the distinctive doctrine of res ipsa
loquitur.
Eickhoff v. Beard-Laney, Inc., 199 S.C. 500, 505, 20 S.E.2d 153, 155 (1942).
102. 219 S.C. 360, 65 S.E.2d 468 (1951).
103. Id. at 364, 65 S.E.2d at 470. Although the evidence presented in Brock was
similar to that presented in Leek, in which the court reversed a verdict for the plaintiff,
the court stated that its decision in Brock did not "impinge" on the decision in Leek. Id.
at 366, 65 S.E.2d at 470.
104. Id. at 361-62, 65 S.E.2d at 468.
105. Id. at 362, 65 S.E.2d at 468.
106. Id. at 361-62, 65 S.E.2d at 468.
107. Id. at 362-63, 65 S.E.2d at 469.
108. Id. at 363, 65 S.E.2d at 469.
109. Id. at 362, 365, 65 S.E.2d at 469, 470. The court treated the defendant's failure
to offer the driver as a witness as a reasonable inference that the driver's testimony
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dence. The trial court granted the defendant's motion for an in-
voluntary nonsuit"0 because the plaintiff failed to offer direct
evidence of the defendant's negligence."" The supreme court re-
manded the case for trial, and held that when a plaintiff
presents sufficient circumstantial evidence from which the
factfinder may conclude that the defendant's negligence is more
probable than not, the defendant must come forward with evi-
dence explaining the accident." 2 The court in Brock, quoting
the New York decision in Herbert v. H. W. Smith Paper Corp.1 3
with approval, found it objectionable to
permit a defendant whose automobile concededly has injured
another to assume the attitude that he need not explain, if he
can, the injury inflicted, merely because no [independent] wit-
ness was present at the instant of the collision and the victim
is dead .... In circumstances such as these, only slight evi-
dence is required to shift to the defendant the burden of
explanation."
14
The decision in Brock embraces a doctrine very similar to
the version of res ipsa loquitur which creates a presumption re-
quiring the defendant to produce evidence." 5 In Brock, the de-
fendant's employee was in control of the bus. Moreover, the
physical evidence indicated that the bus was in the wrong lane
at the time of the accident, a situation which does not normally
occur in the absence of negligence. Additionally, no evidence in-
dicated contributory negligence on the decedent's part. Finally,
although the plaintiff could not offer direct evidence concerning
the accident, the defendant could have done so. One important
difference exists, however, between the court's holding in Brock
and the traditional application of res ipsa loquitur: the court in
would have been unfavorable to the defendant. Id. at 365, 65 S.E.2d at 470 (relying on
Robinson v. Duke Power Co., 213 S.C. 185, 48 S.E.2d 808 (1948)).
110. 219 S.C. at 364-65, 65 S.E.2d at 470. The court correctly treated the motion as
one for a directed verdict because the defendant had offered evidence. Id.
111. Id.
112. Id. at 366, 65 S.E.2d at 470.
113. 243 A.D. 260, 276 N.Y.S. 820 (1935).
114. 219 S.C. at 366, 65 S.E.2d at 470 (quoting Herbert v. H.W. Smith Paper Corp.,
243 A.D. 260, 263, 276 N.Y.S. 820, 823 (1935)).
115. The court in Brock stated that the circumstantial evidence presented at trial
created "an inference of actionable negligence." 219 S.C. at 365, 65 S.E.2d at 470. In
traditional terms, an "inference" which creates a burden of production is the weaker
form of a presumption. See supra notes 43-44 and accompanying text.
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Brock did not require the plaintiff to prove any or all of the
foregoing elements to force the defendant to explain the occur-
rence which caused the injury. Moreover, in Brock, the court
permitted a presumption of both negligence and causation, un-
like the traditional operation of res ipsa loquitur. Although the
decision indicates that the court found the disparity of the par-
ties' abilities to offer direct proof important, it is not clear ex-
actly which circumstances require a defendant's explanation,
and the application and effect of the rule is not strictly de-
fined.116 The circumstantial evidence rule embodied in Brock
creates a presumption of negligence and causation which places
a burden of explanation on the defendant and apparently ap-
plies to situations in which res ipsa loquitur would normally
apply.
117
The South Carolina Court of Appeals recently reaffirmed
the procedural aspects of the circumstantial evidence rule in
Coleman v. Shaw."8 Coleman involved an unexplained drowning
in a motel swimming pool. The Court in Coleman found that the
defendant's failure to supply a lifeguard in violation of certain
safety regulations and statutes constituted negligence per se.'1 9
Consequently, the court permitted circumstantial evidence con-
cerning the circumstances surrounding the drowning itself, when
coupled with the defendant's responsibility for the lack of direct
evidence,1 20 to supply proof of causation sufficient to overturn
summary judgment in the defendant's favor.121
In summary, the South Carolina circumstantial evidence
116. "In a situation like this, the Court should take a very liberal view of the testi-
mony." 219 S.C. at 366, 65 S.E.2d at 470 (emphasis added).
117. Compare the stronger version of presumption followed in Danner v. S.C. Ry.,
16 S.C.L. (4 Rich.) 329 (1851) and similar cases. See supra notes 45-62 and accompany-
ing text.
118. 281 S.C. 107, 314 S.E.2d 154 (Ct. App. 1984).
119. Id. at 114, 314 S.E.2d at 156.
120. If the defendant had supplied a lifeguard, there would have been an eyewitness
to the drowning. Id. at 114, 314 S.E.2d at 157.
121. Id. The Coleman panel relied upon the supreme court's earlier decision in
Shepherd v. U.S. Fidelity & Guar. Co., 233 S.C. 536, 106 S.E.2d 381 (1958). In Shepherd,
the court held that it was proper to require the defendant to explain a collision involving
his runaway automobile. 233 S.C. at 544, 106 S.E.2d at 383-84. The Coleman panel
quoted the following language from Shepherd: "The fact that the evidence does not
clearly disclose the cause of the accident does not necessarily exculpate the defendant."
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rule currently resembles an early version of res ipsa loquitur.
Prior to Weston and similar decisions in the 1930s, South Caro-
lina apparently followed a more rigid version of res ipsa loqui-
tur, at least in certain circumstances, 22 which created a pre-
sumption of negligence and shifted the burden of proof on that
issue to the defendant. After Weston and prior to Brock, South
Carolina apparently rejected res ipsa loquitur in any form, but
permitted the finder of fact to consider the reasonable inferences
from circumstantial evidence produced at trial. As demonstrated
in Peak, circumstantial evidence did not create a presumption,
even in cases in which only the defendant could explain an oc-
currence which allegedly caused an injury.
Brock, Shepherd v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty
Co., 23 and Coleman demonstrate the current application of the
circumstantial evidence rule. In these cases, the factfinder was
permitted to draw any reasonable inference from the evidence
introduced. Moreover, in cases in which a plaintiff cannot, or
cannot without extreme difficulty, present direct evidence con-
cerning breach of duty or causation, the circumstantial evidence
rule places a burden of explanation on the defendant. In Brock,
the defendant controlled the only available eyewitness to the ac-
cident and the evidence otherwise indicated a probability of neg-
ligence.124 In Shepherd and Coleman, however, neither party
could explain the occurrences involved.
125
Practitioners involved in tort cases in which the plaintiff
cannot prove negligence or causation should be familiar with the
operation of the circumstantial evidence rule. In cases in which a
plaintiff lacks direct evidence of the cause of the plaintiff's dam-
age or of the defendant's negligence, and especially in cases in
which a defendant is responsible for the lack of direct evidence
or can explain an occurrence much more easily than the plain-
tiff, the court may deem it fair to force the defendant to come
forward with an explanation of how the damage occurred. In
122. See supra notes 45-62 and accompanying text.
123. 233 S.C. 536, 106 S.E.2d 381 (199).
124. See supra notes 102-17 and accompanying text.
125. In Coleman, the defendant's violation of safety regulations requiring a life-
guard prevented an explanation of the drowning. 281 S.C. at 114, 314 S.E.2d at 157. In
Shepherd, the wife of the defendant's employee had parked the vehicle prior to its roll-
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Coleman, the fact of the injury and the defendant's responsibil-
ity for the absence of direct evidence created a burden of pro-
duction. As in Brock, Leek, and Peak, however, the court may
require the plaintiff to produce sufficient circumstantial evi-
dence to demonstrate that the defendant's negligence or causa-
tion is probable before it will require rebuttal from the
defendant. 12
B. A Plaintiff's Trial Burdens in Multiple Potential-
Defendant Situations
The proof doctrines also apply to situations in which a
plaintiff cannot identify, among a group of possible causative
parties, which party or parties caused an injury.127 The use of
the concert of action doctrine, alternative liability, enterprise li-
ability, or market share liability may permit a plaintiff to re-
cover against a defendant involved in an activity which injures
him, even when another person engaged in the activity may have
inflicted or did inflict the injury.
1. Concert of Action
The concert of action doctrine alters a plaintiff's normal
method of proof with respect to causation. Under this theory,
when two or more persons act together in a single tortious activ-
ity, each is liable for all damage done by the activity. 2 " This
doctrine is variously said to be based upon joint liability, vicari-
ous liability, or joint venture.1 29 The two important prerequisites
for application of the doctrine are participation in a tortious ac-
126. Compare Brock, 219 S.C. 360, 65 S.E.2d 468 (1951)(circumstantial evidence of
bus in wrong lane indicated defendant's negligence and causation were probable), with
Leek, 192 S.C. 527, 7 S.E.2d 459 (1940)(circumstantial evidence failed to indicate defen-
dant's negligence was probable).
127. Res ipsa loquitur and the circumstantial evidence rule also apply in these situ-
ations, but are discussed in the previous section. For a discussion of the overlap of these
doctrines and the other doctrines discussed in this section, see generally Comment, The
Application of Res Ipsa Loquitur in Suits Against Multiple Defendants, 34 ALB. L. REN%
106 (1969). See also Note, supra note 41, at 305-06.
128. See generally W. PROSSER & V.P. KErON, supra note 3, § 46 at 322-24.
129. Id. § 41 at 322; Comment, DES and a Proposed Theory of Enterprise Liabil-
ity, 46 FORDHAM L. REV. 963, 978-85 (1978).
[Vol. 36
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tivity'30 and some degree of agreement or understanding.131
In Skipper v. Hartley, 32 the South Carolina Supreme Court
permitted the plaintiff to recover for the wrongful death of an
automobile passenger who was killed by one of three
automobiles involved in an unlawful automobile race. The court
permitted recovery against the driver of one of the two
automobiles which did not collide with the automobile in which
the plaintiff's decedent was a passenger. The court in Skipper
held that the violation of the statute which prohibited road rac-
ing constituted negligence per se 133 and rejected the defendant's
assertion that the plaintiff had not proven proximate cause.1
34
The court relied on its earlier decision affirming the criminal
conviction of a defendant in a similar position,135 as well as
Boykin v. Bennett,'36 a case in which the North Carolina Su-
preme Court similarly found sufficient evidence of proximate
cause:
Those who participate [in an unlawful road race] are on a
joint venture .... The primary negligence involved is the race
itself. All who willfully participate in speed competition be-
tween motor vehicles on a public highway are jointly and con-
currently negligent and, if damage to one not involved in the
race proximately results from it, all participants are liable, re-
gardless of which of the racing cars actually inflicts the
130. W. PROSSER & W.P. KEETON, supra note 3, § 46 at 323. The range of participa-
tion allowed is quite broad, extending to "all those who ... actively take part in [the
activity], or further it by cooperation or request, or who lend aid or encouragement to
the wrongdoer, or ratify and adopt his acts done for their benefit. . . ." Id. (citations
omitted).
131. Id. "Express agreement is not necessary, and all that is required is that there
be a tacit understanding... . There are even occasional statements that mere knowl-
edge by each party of what the other is doing is sufficient... ." Id. (citations omitted).
For a discussion of South Carolina authority on concert of action (sometimes labeled
"civil conspiracy"), see Charles v. Texas Co., 199 S.C. 156, 169-70, 18 S.E.2d 719, 724
(1942) (recovery for conspiracy to injure business interests); Hosp. Care Corp. v. Com-
mercial Casualty Ins. Co., 194 S.C. 370, 379-80, 9 S.E.2d 796, 803-04 (1940)(agent cannot
act in concert with himself; plaintiff cannot recover for participation in lawful activity).
132. 242 S.C. 221, 130 S.E.2d 486 (1963).
133. Id. at 224, 130 S.E.2d at 488.
134. Id.
135. See State v. Fair, 209 S.C. 439, 40 S.E.2d 634 (1946). In Fair, the court stated
that "it is clear that the act of each [racer] in violating the law regulating the speed of
motor vehicles . . . is, in legal contemplation, the act of both." Id. at 443, 40 S.E.2d at
636.
136. 253 N.C. 725, 118 S.E.2d 12 (1961).
19851
23
Ehlies and Burlington: The Circumstantial Evidence Rule, Concert of Action, Alternative
Published by Scholar Commons, 2020
590 SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 36
injury .... 137
The United States Federal District Court for the District of
South Carolina, in Ryan v. Eli Lilly & Co.,13s granted the defen-
dant drug manufacturer's summary judgment motion and re-
jected the plaintiff's concert of action claim for lack of evi-
dence. 139 In Ryan, the plaintiff alleged injury resulting from the
"collective efforts, agreements and arrangements" between cer-
tain drug manufacturers in marketing, promoting, and present-
ing the benefits of DES, a drug given to pregnant women in the
1940s and 1950s to prevent miscarriage. 140 Although the court in
Ryan recognized the validity of the doctrine in South Carolina,
the court found that the plaintiff had not presented sufficient
evidence to sustain a cause of action under the concert of action
137. 242 S.C. at 225-26, 130 S.E.2d at 488-89 (quoting Boykin v. Bennett, 253 N.C.
725, 731-32, 118 S.E.2d 12, 17 (1961)). For a definition of a joint venture, see Spadley v.
Houser, 247 S.C. 208, 212, 146 S.E.2d 621, 623 (1966).
138. 514 F. Supp. 1004 (D.S.C. 1981). See infra note 140 and accompanying text.
139. 514 F. Supp. at 1012. The court found that the plaintiff had not proven con-
certed action under either South Carolina or North Carolina law. Id. Interestingly, courts
in two states have permitted DES plaintiffs to recover under the concert of action theory
against the same defendant on the same facts. See Abel v. Eli Lilly & Co., 94 Mich. App.
59, 289 N.W.2d 20 (1979), modified, 418 Mich. 311, 343 N.W.2d 164, cert. denied sub
nom., E.R. Squibb & Sons v. Abel, 105 S. Ct. 123 (1984); Bichler v. Eli Lilly & Co., 79
A.D.2d 317, 436 N.Y.S.2d 625 (1981), af'd, 55 N.Y.2d 571, 436 N.E.2d 182, 450 N.Y.S.2d
776 (1982). In Bichler, the court found "the race to win a market share" tortious, and
held that there was sufficient evidence of an agreement among many defendants to sub-
stantiate the claim of concert of action:
The original co-operation by the 12 manufacturers and pooling of informa-
tion, the agreement on the same basic chemical formula, and the adoption of
Lilly's literature as a model for package inserts for joint submission to the
FDA in 1941, can rationally be construed as an express agreement for purposes
of finding concerted action, even if such co-operation was first invited by the
FDA.
79 A.D.2d at 330, 436 N.Y.S.2d at 633.
140. 514 F. Supp. at 1012-13. The drug DES (diethylstilbestrol) allegedly caused
cancer in daughters of some mothers who took the drug. For a discussion of the concert
of action theory with respect to DES litigation, see generally Endress & Sozio, Market
Share Liability: A One Theory Approach Beyond DES, 1983 DEr. C.L. REv. 1 (1983);
Fischer, Products Liability-An Analysis of Market Share Liability, 34 VAND. L. REV.
1623 (1981); Note, DES: Judicial Interest Balancing and Innovation, 22 B.C.L. REv. 747
(1981); Note, Market Share Liability: An Answer to the DES Causation Problem, 94
HARv. L. REV. 668 (1981); Note, Overcoming the Identification Burden in DES Litiga-
tion: The Market Share Liability Theory, 65 MAnQ. L. REV. 609 (1982); Note, Market
Share Liability for Defective Products: An Ill-Advised Remedy for the Problem of Iden-
tification, 76 Nw. U.L. REv. 300 (1981); Comment, DES: Alternative Theories of Liabil-
ity, 59 U. DET. J. URB. L. 387 (1982).
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theory.14' Although several drug manufacturers relied upon each
other for testing and promoting DES, the court reasoned that,
Application of the concept of concert of action to this situation
would [expand the doctrine] far beyond its intended scope and
would render virtually any manufacturer liable for the defec-
tive products of an entire industry, even if it could be demon-




Enterprise liability, a theory similar to concert of action, al-
lows a plaintiff to bring all members of an industry before the
court and hold the entire industry jointly and severally liable for
defects in generically manufactured products. 43 The Supreme
Court of Wisconsin, in Collins v. Eli Lilly & Co.,'" defined the
doctrine as follows: "Under enterprise liability theory, it is the
industry-wide standard that is the cause of injury, and each de-
fendant that participates in perpetuating and using the inade-
quate standard has contributed to and is liable for the plaintiff's
injury.''145 Thus, the application of enterprise liability lifts the
burden, traditionally placed on the plaintiff in a tort cause of
action, of proving that the acts of a specific defendant caused
the plaintiff's injury.
46
The court in Ryan found enterprise liability "repugnant to
the most basic tenets of tort law" and predicted that South Car-
olina would reject enterprise liability because of the traditional
South Carolina allocation of the burden of proof. 47 This conclu-
141. 514 F. Supp. at 1016.
142. Id. (quoting Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories, 26 Cal. 3d 588, 605, 607 P.2d 924,
933, 163 Cal. Rptr. 132, 141 (1980)).
143. This theory is also similar to alternative liability. Comment, supra note 129, at
995. See infra notes 149-52 and accompanying text. The theory originated in Hall v. E.I.
Dupont de Nemours & Co., 345 F. Supp. 353 (E.D.N.Y. 1972)(defective blasting caps).
For a more detailed discussion of the elements of the doctrine, see Comment, supra note
129, at 995.
144. 116 Wis. 2d 166, 342 N.W.2d 37, cert. denied sub nom., E.R. Squibb & Sons,
Inc. v. Collins, 105 S. Ct. 107 (1984).
145. 116 Wis. 2d at 186, 342 N.W.2d at 47.
146. 514 F. Supp. at 1017.
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sion, however, is not necessarily correct because South Carolina
recognizes the concert of action theory and otherwise relaxes or
shifts a plaintiff's trial burdens in certain situations.148
3. Alternative Liability
Alternative liability originated in Summers v. Tice,' a case
in which two hunters injured the plaintiff when both fired their
guns in his direction. The plaintiff could not prove which of the
two hunters fired the shot which struck him.150 Despite this lack
of direct proof, the court in Summers permitted recovery be-
cause the plaintiff proved that one of the two defendants must
have caused the injury and it would be impractical and unfair to
deny recovery in such a situation.' 5 The court held that the
burden of proving causation shifted to the defendants to excul-
pate themselves and that each defendant who could not do so
was jointly and severally liable to the plaintiff.1 5 2 To recover
under the doctrine of alternative liability, a plaintiff must as-
semble before the court all wrongdoers who could have possibly
caused the injury.
148. See, e.g., Brock, 219 S.C. 360, 65 S.E.2d 468 (1951). See also supra notes 102-17
and accompanying text.
149. 33 Cal. 2d 80, 199 P.2d 1 (1948). The doctrine is now embodied in RESTATE-
MENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 433B(3)(1979). See also W. PROSSER & W.P. KMON, supra
note 3, § 41 at 270-72; Comment, supra note 129, at 985-95.
150. 33 Cal. 2d at 83-84, 199 P.2d at 2.
151. Id. at 86-87, 199 P.2d at 4.
152. The court reasoned that, as between an innocent plaintiff and the defendants,
each of whom was negligent, the defendants ought to apportion the damages among
themselves. Id. at 85-86, 199 P.2d at 3-4.
When we consider the relative position of the parties and the results that
would flow if plaintiff was required to pin the injury on one of the defendants
only, a requirement that the burden of proof on that subject be shifted to de-
fendants becomes manifest. They are both wrongdoers-both negligent toward
plaintiff. They brought about a situation where the negligence of one of them
injured the plaintiff, hence it should rest with them each to absolve himself if
he can.
33 Cal. 2d at 86, 199 P.2d at 4. The court in Summers v. Tice relied upon its earlier
decision in Ybarra v. Spangard, 25 Cal. 2d 486, 154 P.2d 687 (1944). In Ybarra, the court
allowed recovery under the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. Ybarra is an example of a situa-
tion in which res ipsa loquitur and alternative liability overlap. The plaintiff in Ybarra
employed res ipsa loquitur to prove negligence and to identify the particular cause of his
injury. See supra note 127 and accompanying text.
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4. Market Share Liability
"Market share liability,"'55 first adopted by the California
Supreme Court in Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories T5 is similar to
alternative liability, but of more recent origin. Market share lia-
bility is a hybrid doctrine which establishes liability as well as
apportions damages. In so doing, market share liability combines
elements of res ipsa loquitur, alternative liability, enterprise lia-
bility, and concert of action."5 Unlike alternative liability and
enterprise liability, however, the market share doctrine does not
require a plaintiff to bring all potential causes of injury before
the court.156 Like concert of action, alternative liability, and en-
terprise liability, the doctrine permits recovery against multiple
defendants engaged in a tortious activity. 57 Like alternative lia-
bility but unlike concert of action, a particular defendant may
exculpate itself by proving that it did not cause the injury.'58
Unlike alternative liability, concert of action, and enterprise lia-
bility, the recovery against a particular defendant is based upon
its market share and liability is not joint and several. 59
The United States Federal District Court for the District of
South Carolina rejected market share liability in both Ryan and
Mizell v. Eli Lilly & Co.' 60 because the theory allows recovery
despite the fact that some possible defendants are not before the
153. This theory is more properly described by the label "liability according to mar-
ket share."
154. 26 Cal. 3d 588, 607 P.2d 924, 163 Cal. Rptr. 132 (1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S.
912 (1981). Sindell, a DES case, is factually similar to Ryan and Mizell. See infra notes
160-64 and accompanying text for a discussion of Ryan and Mizell. Other jurisdictions
have recently approved market share liability. See, e.g., Hardy v. Johns-Mansville Sales
Corp., 509 F. Supp. 1353 (E.D. Tex. 1981)(action against manufacturers of asbestos),
rev'd on other grounds, 681 F.2d 334 (1982); Copeland v. Celotex Corp., 447 So. 2d 908
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984)(action against manufacturers of asbestos). For a general dis-
cussion of the doctrine, see Comment, Policy and Proof. Shifting the Burden of Proof in
a Products Liability Case, 34 BAYLOR L. REv. 83 (1980).
155. Comment, supra note 154, at 94.
156. The court in Sindell approved a finding of liability in cases in which the plain-
tiff joins all defendants who collectively hold "a substantial share" of the market for the
injury-causing agent. 26 Cal. 3d at 612, 607 P.2d at 937, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 145. See also
Abraham & Musgrave, The DES Labyrinth, 33 S.C.L. REv. 663, 682 (1982); Torts, An-
nual Survey of South Carolina Law, 34 S.C.L. REV. 215, 225 (1982).
157. 26 Cal. 3d at 612, 607 P.2d at 937, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 145.
158. Id.
159. Id. See also Comment, supra note 129, at 999-1000.
160. 526 F. Supp. 589 (D.S.C. 1981).
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court.101 In both instances, the district court based its decision
on the traditional South Carolina common law requirement that
the plaintiff prove proximate cause.16 2 The court in Mizell stated
that,
The unequivocal law of South Carolina is the plaintiff in a
negligence action has not only the burden of proving negligence
but also the burden of proving that the injury or damage was
caused by the actionable conduct of the particular defen-
dant .... The Supreme Court of South Carolina has not
carved out any exceptions to this traditional rule. The Court
places the burden of proof of proximate cause squarely on the
plaintiff. Application of this burden-shifting theory would vio-
late established public policy and fundamental principles of
tort law and procedure in this state in a variety of ways.
163
The federal court's treatment of this issue, however, does
not necessarily preclude the application of the market share lia-
bility theory. The district court did not discuss the most impor-
tant exception to a plaintiff's traditional burden of proof-the
operation of the circumstantial evidence rule. Based on the
deeply rooted preference for jury resolution and on the decisions
in Brock, Tate, Gantt, Coleman and similar cases, the South
Carolina Supreme Court or the South Carolina Court of Appeals
may permit recovery under the theory of market share liability.
As in Tate and Gantt, 64 a South Carolina court may find that
sufficient circumstantial evidence exists to permit a jury infer-
ence of causation from the fact of substantial market share. In
cases involving fungible manufactured goods, in which direct ev-
idence of causation is typically not available to a plaintiff, a
court may require a defendant to produce evidence disproving
causation 65
IV. CONCLUSION
In South Carolina, a tort plaintiff usually must plead his
161. Ryan v. Eli Lilly & Co., 514 F. Supp. 1004, 1018-19 (D.S.C. 1981); Mizell v. Eli
Lilly & Co., 526 F. Supp. 589, 597 (D.S.C. 1981).
162. Ryan, 514 F. Supp. at 1018; Mizell, 526 F. Supp. at 596.
163. 526 F. Supp. at 596 (quoting Ryan, 514 F. Supp. at 1018-19).
164. See supra notes 91-99 and accompanying text.
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cause of action, produce evidence, and prove his case by a pre-
ponderance of the evidence. In some situations, however, the cir-
cumstantial evidence rule and the concert of action doctrine may
alter the traditional format. The circumstantial evidence rule
permits a plaintiff to prove, indirectly, breach of duty and cau-
sation. In cases in which the plaintiff is unable to present direct
evidence, the court may require the defendant to produce evi-
dence that he was not negligent and did not cause the plaintiff's
injury, especially in those cases in which the defendant is re-
sponsible for the lack of evidence.
In cases involving participation in a tortious activity which
injures a plaintiff, the court may hold all who participate jointly
and severally liable. It is unclear whether a plaintiff in South
Carolina may recover under alternative liability, enterprise lia-
bility, or market share liability. In tort cases in which the plain-
tiff is confronted with elements of his cause of action which are
impossible or difficult to prove, South Carolina plaintiffs and de-
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